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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL LAW-Absent a
Knowing and Intelligent Waiver, No Person May Be Im-
prisoned for Any Offense Unless Represented by Counsel
at Trial.
Jon Richard Argersinger was arrested in Leon County, Florida and
charged with carrying a concealed weapon. This offense, under Flor-
ida law, is a misdemeanor punishable by up to six months imprison-
ment and a $1,000 fine. Argersinger, an indigent, was tried before a
judge without the assistance of counsel. Sentenced to 90 days in jail,
he brought a habeas corpus petition before the Florida Supreme Court.
Argersinger alleged that as an indigent layman he had been unable
to present to the trial court good and sufficient defenses without the
assistance of counsel. The Florida Supreme Court' faced the issue of
the applicability of Gideon v. Wainwright2 to a state trial of a misde-
meanor offense. Gideon had held that an indigent defendant in a fel-
ony prosecution has a fundamental due process right under the four-
teenth amendment to the assistance of appointed counsel at trial.3
The Florida court reasoned that assuming Gideon were eventually to
be extended by the United States Supreme Court, such extension would
be in accord with the more recent decisions on the right to trial by jury
announced in Duncan v. Louisiana4 and Baldwin v. New York.5
These decisions had limited the federal constitutional right to trial by
jury to offenses punishable by a sentence of over six months imprison-
ment. Since Argersinger had not been charged with such an offense,
the court decided that he was not entitled to appointed counsel at trial
and, therefore, discharged the writ. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari' and reversed.7
The issue before the Court was whether the protection of Gideon
was to be extended, and if so, to what kinds of offenses. Reasoning
that counsel is essential whenever a defendant's liberty is at stake, the
Court held that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person
1. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970).
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. Id. at 345.
4. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
5. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
6. 401 U.S. 908 (1971).
7. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misde-
meanor or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial."8
BACKGROUND
The right to appointed counsel in a state capital case was established
in Powell v. Alabama.9 There the Court explored the practical and
theoretical bases for this right. Counsel was adjudged a necessary req-
uisite of due process in capital cases and thus was made applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. 10
Although the Powell case involved a defendant charged with a cap-
ital offense, its broad language, quoted with approval in Argersinger,
laid a theoretical base for the right to counsel in all criminal cases.
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if
it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, gen-
erally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or
bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without
the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge,
and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant
to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he
have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he
be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does
not know how to establish his innocence. . . . If in any case, civ-
il or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to
hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it
reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a de-
nial of a hearing, and, therefor, of due process in the constitutional
sense."
In 1942, the Supreme Court in Betts v. Brady2 dealt with the issue
of a right to appointed counsel in a state felony case. There the Court
denied there was an unconditional right to appointed counsel, but left
the door open in cases of "special circumstances." The Court in Betts
stated:
8. Id. at 37.
9. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
10. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
11. 287 U.S. at 68-69.
12. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not in-
corporate, as such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth
Amendment although a denial by a state of rights or privileges
specifically embodied in that and others of the first eight amend-
ments may, in certain circumstances, or in connection with other
elements, operate in a given case, to deprive a litigant of due proc-
ess of law in violation of the Fourteenth. l"
Betts left it to the discretion of the trial judge to appoint counsel
when such appointment seemed "to be required in the interest of fair-
ness."14
Twenty-one years later in 1963, the United States Supreme Court
decided Gideon v. Wainwright.5 Gideon had been charged with
breaking and entering a poolroom with the intent to commit a misde-
meanor, a felony under Florida law. At his trial, Gideon requested
the court to appoint counsel and was refused. He conducted his own
defense, was convicted and was sentenced to five years in the state pris-
on. Gideon brought a habeas corpus petition to the Florida Supreme
Court claiming a denial of his sixth amendment right to counsel. Aft-
er the Florida court denied all relief, the United States Supreme Court
reviewed the question and reversed. Overruling Betts v. Brady, the
Court held that due to the refusal to appoint counsel, Gideon had been
denied a right which is fundamental and essential to a fair trial.' 6
Mr. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion to Gideon, contended
that the rule of Betts had continued to exist in form17 while its sub-
stance had been substantially and steadily eroded. This was due to the
Court's increasing willingness to find these "special circumstances" 18
-it found them without exception in all cases since 1950. Justice
Harlan characterized the Gideon Court as having come to recognize
"that the mere existence of a serious criminal charge constituted in it-
self special circumstances requiring the services of counsel at trial."'19
Gideon settled the issue of the right to appointed counsel in felony
trials; the decision, however, went no further. Mr. Justice Harlan
commented parenthetically: "Whether the rule should be extended to
all criminal cases need not now be decided. '20
13. Id. at 461-62.
14. Id. at 472.
15. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
16. Id. at 345.
17. Two cases which denied that there were special circumstances sufficient to
appoint counsel were Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S.
728 (1948).
18. E.g., Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960); Chewning v. Cunning-
ham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962).
19. 372 U.S. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 351.
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The Court denied certiorari in instances subsequent to Gideon and
prior to Argersinger where the issue of right to counsel in less than fel-
ony length sentences had arisen.21 (Traditionally, a felony has been
defined as any offense which carries a potential punishment of more
than one year.) 22  In a per curiam decision in Patterson v. Warden,23
the Court vacated and remanded to the Maryland Supreme Court for
further consideration in light of Gideon. In Patterson the accused was
convicted of a misdemeanor after being refused appointed counsel.
However, the defendant was sentenced to two years imprisonment, a
length beyond the standard one year felony definition.24 Thus, since
Gideon and until Argersinger, the Supreme Court had shed no light on
the question in cases involving less than felony length sentences, what-
ever the crime be named.
Since 1963, there have been several Federal Circuit Court decisions
dealing with the right to appointed counsel in certain misdemeanor sit-
uations. In Harvey v. Mississippi," the defendant was arrested for
possession of whiskey, a misdemeanor under state law. Harvey plead-
ed guilty, expecting only a fine. On his court day, without the assist-
ance of counsel, he was sentenced to 90 days imprisonment and fined
$500.
The Fifth Circuit, hearing Harvey's habeas corpus appeal, held that
the failure to inform the defendant of his right to counsel "invalidated
his guilty plea and rendered his conviction and incarceration constitu-
tionally improper."26 In reaching its decision, the court dealt with the
distinction between felony and misdemeanor. The court pointed out
that: "It is true that the cases which support appellant's argument all
involved felony convictions, but their rationale does not seem to depend
on the often purely formal distinction between felonies and misdemean-
ors."2  The court quoted with approval from Evans v. Rives,"a which
had extended the right to appointed counsel to federal misdemeanor
cases:
It is . . . suggested . . . that the constitutional guaranty of the
right to the assistance of counsel in a criminal case does not apply
except in the event of 'serious offenses.' No such differentiation is
21. E.g., De Joseph v. Connecticut, 3 Conn. Cir. 624, 222 A.2d 752, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 982 (1966); Hendrix v. Seattle, 76 Wash. 2d 142, 456 P.2d 696 (1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 948 (1970).
22. See, e.g., the federal definition of a felony at 18 U.S.C. § 1.
23. 372 U.S. 776 (1963).
24. Patterson v. Maryland, 227 Md. 194, 175 A.2d 746 (1961).
25. 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
26. Id. at 271.
27. Id. at 269.
28. 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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made in the wording of the guaranty itself, and we are cited to no
authority, and know of none, making this distinction. The pur-
pose of the guaranty is to give assurance against deprivation of life
or liberty except strictly according to law. The petitioner would
be as effectively deprived of his liberty by a sentence to a year in
jail for the crime of non-support of a minor child as by a sentence
to a year in jail for any other crime, however serious. And so far
as the right to the assistance of counsel is concerned, the Constitu-
tion draws no distinction between loss of liberty for a short period
and such loss for a long one. 29
Thus, in a guilty plea proceeding, the right to appointed counsel was
established without regard to the designation of the charge-felony or
misdemeanor.,
In 1968, the Fifth Circuit decided Goslin v. Thomas,3 ° which held
that the right to counsel in that jurisdiction extended to all state misde-
meanor cases. This case again involved a guilty plea. The court fol-
lowed Harvey v. Mississippi"' and McDonald v. Moore82 and referred
to the then recent Duncan v. Louisiana" decision on the right to jury
trial. The court in Goslin felt that Duncan supported the Fifth Cir-
cuit rule since they viewed Duncan as establishing that a misdemeanor
defendant was entitled to a jury. The court repeated the Gideon em-
phasis on the need for a lawyer in any criminal prosecution and
stressed the artificiality of the felony-misdemeanor distinction.3 4
Other federal appeals courts also dealt with the right to counsel for
misdemeanants. In Winters v. Beck, 5 an indigent defendant was
tried and convicted without counsel for obscene and lascivious con-
duct. He received a 30-day jail sentence and a $250 fine plus costs.
Because he was unable to pay the fine, he was sentenced to 284 days
on a penal farm. The Arkansas Supreme Court denied there was any
29. Id. at 638. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) had previously established
the right to counsel in federal prosecutions in a felony case. These decisions were
codified in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(b): "Appointment of counsel.-In every criminal
case in which the defendant is charged with a felony or a misdemeanor, other than a
petty offense, and appears without counsel, the United States magistrate or the court
shall advise the defendant that he has the right to be represented by counsel and that
counsel will be appointed to represent him if he is financially unable to obtain counsel.
Unless the defendant waives the appointment of counsel, the United States magistrate
or the court, if satisfied after appropriate inquiry that the defendant is financially un-
able to obtain counsel, shall appoint counsel to represent him."
30. 400 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1968).
31. 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
32. 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965). This case was factually similar to Harvey
and followed its reasoning.
33. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
34. The Fifth Circuit later held that the right to appointed counsel also applied in a
situation where the defendant did not plead guilty. James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325
(5th Cir. 1969).
35. 239 Ark. 1151, 397 S.W.2d 364 (1965).
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requirement to appoint counsel in a misdemeanor case. The Supreme
Court denied certiorari;36 Mr. Justice Stewart, in dissent, pointed out
the conflict Winters presented with the Fifth Circuit decisions of Har-
vey v. Mississipi and McDonald v. Moore.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with Winters' request for
habeas corpus relief and concluded that "the right to counsel cannot
be dependent upon the mere arbitrary label that a state legislature at-
taches to an offense. ' '311 Winters had been sentenced to jail for ap-
proximately nine and one half months which the court found to be of
sufficient gravity to entitle the defendant to appointed counsel. Win-
ters does not hold that there is a right to counsel for all misdemeanors,
nor does it interpret the Fifth Circuit as having established that propo-
sition. The Eighth Circuit accepted the Harvey rationale and stated
that " . . . the right to counsel must be recognized regardless of the
label of the offense if, as here, the accused may be or is subjected to
deprivation of his liberty for a substantial period of time. ' 38  Thus, the
line was drawn at confinement for a substantial period rather than the
felony-misdemeanor distinction which had gained emphasis as a result
of Gideon.
Since the Supreme Court decision in Gideon, these lower federal
courts wrestled with the problem of the appointment of counsel in mi-
nor offense prosecutions. These decisions, which laid the groundwork
for Argersinger, demonstrated the erosion of two concepts. The va-
lidity of the felony-misdemeanor distinction was discredited. Such a
distinction-merely the designation of an offense-was abandoned as the
criterion for affording a constitutional protection. A criterion based
on a specific length of imprisonment was also questioned. Even a
short period of confinement was recognized as a serious consequence.
However, it remained for the Supreme Court in Argersinger to take
the step not taken by any of the lower federal courts and hold that be-
fore any deprivation of liberty may be imposed, counsel must be ap-
pointed.
THE DECISION
Argersinger v. Hamlin was handed down on June 12, 1972.19 Mr.
36. 385 U.S. 907 (1966).
37. Beck v. Winters, 407 F.2d 125, 130 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 963
(1969).
38. 407 F.2d at 128.
39. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, and Blackmun. Mr. Chief Justice Burger con-
curred in the result. Mr. Justice Brennan filed a concurring opinion in which Justices
Douglas and Stewart joined. Mr. Justice Powell concurred in the result and filed an
opinion in which Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined.
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Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, first reviewed the sixth
amendment 40 protections made applicable to the states by the four-
teenth amendment. He stated that the rights to public trial, to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and to confront wit-
nesses have not been limited to felonies, nor to lesser but serious of-
fenses. These were contrasted with the right to trial by jury which, ac-
cording to Justice Douglas, arose from a different "genealogy."41
This different genealogy has been used to justify the limitation on
the right to trial by jury which developed from Duncan v. Louisiana.42
In Baldwin v. New York 43 a defendant was held to be entitled to a jury
trial where the potential punishment was confinement for six months
or more. The Court in Argersinger distinguished the right to counsel
from the right to jury trial and refused to apply the six month limita-
tion to the right to counsel. The Court emphasized the importance of
counsel in misdemeanor and petty offense prosecutions which may in-
volve issues no less complex than when a long prison penalty is possi-
ble. In the misdemeanor trial, counsel is needed to deal with the prob-
lems involved in pleading, and to counterbalance the unfairness which
results from the obsession for speed due to the great volume of misde-
meanor cases. Without counsel, prejudice may result to misdemeanor
defendants from such "assembly line" justice. Considering these fac-
tors, the Court held that unless represented by counsel at his trial, or
unless knowingly and intelligently waiving counsel, no person may be
imprisoned for any offense, regardless of whether classified as petty,
misdemeanor or felony.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion agreed with the
Court on the importance of counsel in any trial where imprisonment
can result. His primary focus was on the procedure to be followed in
deciding on the appointment of counsel. The prosecutor and trial
judge must "engage in a predictive evaluation of each case to deter-
mine whether there is a significant likelihood that, if the defendant is
convicted, the trial judge will sentence him to a jail term."' 4
40. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence.
41. 407 U.S. at 29.
42. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
43. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
44. 407 U.S. at 42 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
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Mr. Justice Powell wrote a lengthy opinion dealing primarily with
the complications and practical difficulties he envisioned as a result of
the decision. Although concurring in the result, Justice Powell would
have preferred a less mechanistic application than the rigid rule adopt-
ed by the Court. He suggested his own rule in which each case would
be decided on its own facts, thereby maintaining greater judicial dis-
cretion. He also pointed out that the majority made no distinction be-
tween deprivations of liberty and deprivations of property. Thus, the
logic of the decision is equally applicable to cases involving other pen-
alties which lack confinement.
Justice Powell foresaw two kinds of equal protection problems
which could result from Argersinger. The first would occur in a pet-
ty offense judgment involving fine or imprisonment.45 If no imprison-
ment is likely to be imposed with respect to certain offenses, an indi-
gent defendant will be receiving a different treatment from a defendant
who can pay. Due to his indigency, no effective penalty whatsoever is
likely to be imposed. The other difficulty would be the possibility of
individual defendants in different courts of the same jurisdiction re-
ceiving different treatment. This could result from the differing prac-
tices of judges in leaving open the imprisonment option by appointing
counsel. However, this fear seems exaggerated since, as is discussed
later, it is likely that there will be an eventual standardization of treat-
ment according to the policies of the local jurisdiction. Justice Powell
expressed great apprehension about the ability of the legal profession to
cope with the added demands for legal counsel Argersinger would cre-
ate. His principal concern was with the uneven distribution of legal
resources which has its most negative effect in small rural communities.
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
The majority contrasted the different "genealogy" of the right to
jury trial with that of the right to counsel in order to justify not limiting
the two rights in the same manner. This distinction appears to be pri-
marily historical, rather than theoretical. Baldwin v. New York 46 and
Duncan v. Louisiana7 discussed the history of jury trials in England
45. 407 U.S. at 55, n.17 (Powell, J., concurring): "The type of penalty dis-
cussed above (involving the discretionary alternative of 'jail or fine') presents serious
problems of fairness-both to indigents and nonindigents and to the administration of
justice. Cf. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971). No adequate resolution of these in-
herently difficult problems has yet been found. The rule adopted by the Court today,
depriving the lower courts of all discretion in such cases unless counsel is available and
is appointed, could aggravate the problem."
46. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
47. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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and the American colonies. The Court in Baldwin stated " . . . with
a few exceptions, crimes triable without a jury in the American States
since the late 18th century were also generally punishable by no more
than a six month prison term."4
This historical six month limitation on the right to jury trial was con-
trasted to the colonial practice concerning the right to counsel. The
colonies had expanded the common law right to counsel by permitting
it in all criminal cases. 9 The Court thus viewed the sixth amend-
ment as extending the right to counsel beyond its common law dimen-
sions, without retracting the right from lesser offenses for which it had
originally been provided. Using this historical base, and seemingly
concluding that the right to counsel is a "more fundamental" right
than trial by jury, the Court rejected the "premise that since prosecu-
tions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for less than six months
may be tried without a jury, they may also be tried without a lawyer." 50
The historical differences between the right to counsel and the right
to jury trial may be a valid basis for distinguishing the extent to which
each will be applied. However, perhaps the actual basis, although un-
stated, is that the right to counsel is in itself of a more fundamental
nature than the right to jury trial. For example, when the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Goslin v. Thomas5 held there was a right to appointed counsel
in all state misdemeanor cases, the court speculated: "Indeed, the right
to counsel may be more important than the right to a jury trial if the
two are to be compared. It often happens that the only effective
means of securing other valuable constitutional rights is through com-
petent counsel." 52
In any event, Argersinger indicates that at least in the trial of a mi-
nor offense, a lawyer is more essential and a greater safeguard than a
jury. One inference that can be drawn from this is that the right to
counsel outweighs practical considerations any time that confinement
will occur; whereas, the right to a jury outweighs practical considera-
48. 399 U.S. at 71.
49. "Originally, in England, a person charged with treason or felony was denied the
aid of counsel, except in respect of legal questions which the accused himself might
suggest. At the same time parties in civil cases and persons accused of misdemeanors
were entitled to the full assistance of counsel .... [It] appears that in at least twelve
of the thirteen colonies, the rule of the English common law, in the respect now under
consideration, had been definitively rejected and the right to counsel fully recognized
in all criminal prosecutions, save that in one or two instances the right was limited to
capital offenses or to the more serious crimes ...... Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
60 and 64-65 (1932).
50. 407 U.S. at 30-31.
51. 400 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1968).
52. Id. at 598.
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tions only when six months imprisonment is possible. The practical
costs of a jury in any prosecution will be greater than that of counsel,
not only in terms of money but in terms of its effect on the efficient
administration of justice.
The limitation on the right to trial by jury could have been used as
support for the Argersinger limitation. The Court, however, used the
different genealogy approach to justify not accepting the same limit as
has been accepted with respect to the right to jury trial. The sixth
amendment refers to all criminal prosecutions. Of the protections
enunciated therein, only the rights to counsel and trial by jury have not
been literally interpreted as applying to all criminal prosecutions. By
distinguishing the right to counsel from the right to trial by jury, the
Argersinger Court implied that the right to counsel is more akin to the
all-inclusive protections. 3 However, in Argersinger the Court is set-
ting a new limit on how far the constitutional protection of a sixth
amendment right will be extended. The right to appointed counsel is
made "fundamental" only where imprisonment is likely; the right to
trial by jury only when that imprisonment is six months or longer.
Thus, in fact, in the case of both these rights, a limit still exists; a con-
stitutional protection is again not being interpreted as extending to all
crimes. The Court could have concluded that the two rights were both of
a "fundamental" character, and that both could be constitutionally lim-
ited due to historical and practical reasons. Even though a different
line is being drawn, in both instances the full exercise of constitutional
rights is being restricted by the nature of the penalty.
THE POSSIBILITY OF THE FUTURE EXTENSION OF THE RIGHT
TO APPOINTED COUNSEL
In Gideon v. Wainwright,5 the Supreme Court held that, in a felony
trial, an indigent defendant has a right to appointed counsel. In Ar-
gersinger v. Hamlin, the Supreme Court held that, whenever any im-
prisonment is to be imposed, an indigent defendant has the same right
to appointed counsel. Mr. Justice Douglas, in Argersinger, stated that
although the offense in Gideon was a felony, the rationale in that case
did not limit the need of counsel to felonies only. 5 In Argersinger the
defendant was sentenced to jail, yet the rationale of this decision need
not be limited to jail sentences only. Because Argersinger involved
imprisonment, Justice Douglas believed that it was not necessary for
53. See note 40 supra and discussion at p. 279 herein.
54. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
55. 407 U.S. at 31.
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the Court to consider the requirements of the sixth amendment where
loss of liberty is not involved.
The rationale of Argersinger does not come to a natural end only
where imprisonment is imposed; the Court has placed an arbitrary limit
on its arguments and logic. The ground for the decision appears to be
the fundamental nature of the right to counsel. This fundamental na-
ture requires the appointment of an attorney for any indigent before
imprisonment can result. However, there is no apparent reason why
counsel becomes any less useful or essential to the layman where im-
prisonment is not involved. The due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment protects a person against deprivations of both liberty and
property. If the right to appointed counsel is required where liberty is
at stake, a literal reading of the Constitution would lead to the same
requirement where property is at stake.
Mr. Justice Powell, concurring in Argersinger, stated: "The major-
ity opinion suggests no constitutional basis for distinguishing between
deprivations of liberty and property. In fact, the majority suggests no
reason at all for drawing this distinction." '56 He viewed the present de-
cision as foreshadowing a broad prophylactic rule applicable to all pet-
ty offenses.
The due process protection of property has been dealt with in terms
of eminent domain, 7 the taking of private property for state use,58 or
in terms of the vast field of economic regulation.59 However, the sub-
ject of due process as applied to the taking of property in the form of
a fine in a criminal prosecution has not been developed or explained
by the courts.
If sometime in the future, the Supreme Court should specifically
hold that the right to counsel does not extend to non-imprisonment
cases, this would imply that property was being considered inferior to
liberty. Such a distinction would be difficult to constitutionally justi-
fy. Considering the social stigma which attaches to any criminal con-
viction, deprivation of property should be entitled to as great a protec-
tion as deprivation of liberty. The community is saying in both in-
stances: "We are punishing you because you are a criminal, a wrong-
doer." For example, if Jon Argersinger had been punished by only a
56. Id. at 51-52 (Powell, J., concurring).
57. E.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
58. E.g., Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
59. E.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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$500 fine with no imprisonment, he still would have been convicted of
a crime and still would have acquired the social stigma of a criminal.
There is another viewpoint from which it can be argued that the
right to counsel should extend to cases involving fines as well as those
involving imprisonment. This argument stems from the equal protec-
tion clause. One basis for making the Argersinger decision could have
been that the equal protection clause demands that an indigent be pro-
vided with a lawyer in a situation where a man of means would have
employed one. The Respondent's brief points out that this question
was not raised before the Florida Supreme Court and therefore could
not be raised before the United States Supreme Court.60 The previous
decisions in the right to counsel area have rested on the fundamental
nature of the right, not on an equal protection basis. Of probable sig-
nificance to the question of a right to counsel where the defendant faces
only a fine is the decision of Mayer v. Chicago.61 There, the indigent de-
fendant was convicted of the nonfelony charges of disorderly con-
duct and interference with police officers in violation of city ordinances.
His penalty was a fine only. He petitioned the Circuit Court for the
transcript of the proceeding for an appeal. His request was refused on
the basis of a state supreme court rule which denied a free transcript
in the appeal of a nonfelony case. The United States Supreme Court
held that the limitation on providing free trial transcripts in felony
trials only was an "'unreasoned distinction' proscribed by the Four-
teenth Amendment."6 1
In reaching its decision, the Court rejected the city's argument that
the case could be distinguished from Griffin v. Illinois"3 because in all
previous transcript cases the defendants were sentenced to some term
of confinement, whereas Mayer was merely fined. The Court stated:
The invidiousness of the discrimination that exists when criminal
procedures are made available only to those who can pay is not
erased by any differences in the sentences that may be imposed.
• .. The practical effects of conviction of even petty offenses of
the kind involved here are not to be minimized. A fine may bear
as heavily on an indigent accused as forced confinement. The
60. Brief for the Respondent at 19-22, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
61. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
62. Id. at 196.
63. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In Griffin, the Court held that an indigent must be pro-
vided with a free transcript of the trial when such a transcript is necessary for appellate
review. In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) the Court held that an indi-
gent had a right to the assistance of appointed counsel on appeal. The equal protection
rationale in these cases is basically that the justice of a man's trial must not depend on
how much money he has.
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collateral consequences of conviction may be even more serious.
64
Thus, the Court declared that the fine-imprisonment distinction was
not an adequate basis on which to limit a procedural protection. Ar-
guably, neither should such a distinction be used as the basis to limit
the constitutional protection of the right to counsel to imprisonment
cases.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARGERSINGER
The Views of the Justices
A general picture of where the various states stood on the issue of
appointed counsel prior to Argersinger can be obtained from an exam-
ination of recent studies.6 5  In fifteen states this decision will have no
direct effect,66 since these states had previously recognized the right to
appointed counsel for any offense in which imprisonment may result.6 7
Of the remaining thirty-five states in which this decision will have an
impact, sixteen68 had extended the right to counsel to offenses less
than felony level, and nineteen69 still adhered to the felony only stan-
dard. These divisions reflected the individual state's definitions of fel-
ony, serious crime and misdemeanor. This lack of uniformity ob-
scures comparisons of state procedure.7 0  Gideon itself was of no effect
64. 404 U.S. at 197.
65. See, e.g., Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L.
REV. 685 (1968). Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright
in the Fifty States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103 (1969). Comment, Will the Trumpet of
Gideon Be Heard in All the Halls of Justice?, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 450 (1971).
66. California, Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, West
Virginia, Wyoming.
67. Some states go beyond Argersinger. "California's requirement extends to traf-
fic violations. Blake v. Municipal Court, 242 Cal. App. 2d 731, 51 Cal. Reptr. 771."
407 U.S. at 27, n.1.
68. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin.
69. Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia.
70. See generally Comment, Continuing Echoes of Gideon's Trumpet-The Indigent
Defendant and the Misdemeanor, 10 S. TEX. L.J. 222, 223 & n.3 (1968):
A definitional problem exists from one state to another as regards the labeling
of the same offenses. Whereas Texas considers 'offense' and 'crime' to be
synonymous, thereby including misdemeanors, felonies, and capital felonies,
New York deems an 'offense' and an 'infraction' to be a breach of the law
lower in magnitude than a misdemeanor and calls such junctures 'petty' vio-
lations; and New Jersey calls these petty violations 'quasi-crimes.' In some
states such as Florida and Arizona, adultery is classed as a felony, but as a
misdemeanor in other states such as Kansas. Further illustrating the problem
created by an arbitrary felony-misdemeanor classification is that even though
a crime be classed as a felony or as a misdemeanor in all states, the possible
punishment varies greatly from state to state. New Jersey designates most
crimes as misdemeanors or high misdemeanors.
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in the many states which had already extended the right to appointed
counsel for felony trials.7 ' Argersinger now removes this problem of
definitions for purposes of the right to appointed counsel. No longer
can the right to counsel vary according to a given state's arbitrary defi-
nitions of felony and misdemeanor. Now a lawyer must be appointed
anytime imprisonment is to be imposed.
Mr. Justice Powell expressed great concern with the capacity of the
legal profession to cope with the potential added strain. He feared
grave effects to an already overburdened criminal justice system. Mr.
Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion, minimized these factors,
pointing to the availability of law students to augment the nation's le-
gal resources. Chief Justice Burger was confident that the "dynamics
of the profession have a way of rising to the burdens placed on it."72
In any event, as the Chief Justice noted, the burden that the states will
have to bear in providing counsel cannot be allowed to control the
application of a fundamental constitutional right, once a right be recog-
nized as such.
In the majority opinion, Justice Douglas stated that the Court does
not sit as an "ombudsman to direct state courts how to manage their
affairs but only to make clear the federal constitutional requirement. '73
Yet the practical result of the decision is clear: "Under the rule we an-
nounce today, every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor
starts that no imprisonment may be imposed even though local law per-
mits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel."74  However, as
Justice Powell pointed out, "The opinion is disquietingly barren of de-
tails as to how this rule will be implemented. '7
Chief Justice Burger offered his appraisal of the pretrial consulta-
tion between prosecutor and trial judge that he envisioned must take
place in deciding on the matter of counsel. Prior to trial, the judge is
to be given information about the accused and the offense charged in
order to aid him in deciding if a jail sentence is likely. The Chief Jus-
tice minimized any impairment of judicial impartiality this may cause.
This potential difficulty could be eliminated if a judge other than the
trial judge makes the preliminary decision on counsel. If this bifur-
cated procedure is not adopted the "predictive evaluation" 76 prior to
71. According to one commentator, Gideon would have been provided with counsel
in forty-five states. Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wain-
wright in the Fifty States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103, 104 (1969).
72. 407 U.S. 25, 44 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
73. Id. at 38.
74. Id. at 40.
75. Id. at 52 (Powell, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 42 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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the determination of guilt or innocence certainly would not benefit a
defendant with a dubious past.
Justice Powell would have preferred to hold that "the right to coun-
sel in petty offense cases is not absolute but is one to be determined by
the trial courts exercising a judicial discretion on a case-by-case bas-
is."" He viewed the new rule as too rigid, disliking the loss of judicial
discretion. Now the judge must appoint counsel whenever imprison-
ment is to be imposed. Justice Powell would have employed a less
mechanistic application that would follow a principle of "fundamen-
tal fairness." The process he outlined would have considered the com-
plexity of the offense involved, the probable sentence in case of a con-
viction and the individual factors peculiar to each defendant. This he
saw as similar to the former rule of Betts v. Brady78 which held that
there was no automatic right to counsel in felony cases except in "spe-
cial circumstances." Justice Powell felt one reason why that rule was
rejected in Gideon was its misapplication in state courts, rather than
any constitutional infirmity.
It is interesting to speculate what Justice Powell's guidelines, if
adopted, would mean. He appeared to be saying that the majority
opinion was going too far. However, one of his criteria for appointing
counsel was the probable sentence. He stated that "imprisonment is
not the only serious consequence the court should consider. ' 79  He also
would have weighed other consequences such as social stigma or loss
of a driver's license which could be as serious as confinement in a giv-
en situation. However, if imprisonment were to be considered at all,
it would be difficult to see where once it had been considered, counsel
would be denied. By the Powell procedure, other punishment conse-
quences would be included, along with the complexity of the case, and
any special circumstances. The weighing of all these elements could
lead to extending the right to appointed counsel to situations beyond
those included in the majority coverage.
In cases involving a small term of imprisonment and where there are
no other contravening factors, Justice Powell would not appoint coun-
sel. However, in these clear-cut situations, the defendant himself is in
the best position to decide if he desires to waive counsel. The majority
left the decision on counsel to the defendant; Justice Powell would have
preferred it rested with the judge. Justice Powell may also have been
77. Id. at 63 (Powell, J., concurring).
78. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). As discussed, the Betts rule is known as the "special
circumstances" rule. The rule emphasized judicial discretion in the individual case.
E.g., Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
79. 407 U.S. at 64 (Powell, J., concurring).
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in disagreement with the majority in their failure to make clear that
the judge retains discretion to appoint counsel in situations which do
not involve imprisonment but do involve the other factors. In the fu-
ture, it is likely that the explicit holding of Argersinger will discourage
judges from appointing counsel in non-imprisonment cases regardless
of the complexity of the legal issues. Thus, the Argersinger decision
could serve as a brake to the exercise of judicial discretion in situations
where the Supreme Court has not yet said appointed counsel is con-
stitutionally required.
Who Decides and With What Standards?
Argersinger leaves undetermined the question of who will ultimately
make the decision on the appointment of counsel. The choice may ac-
tually be made by the prosecutor in determining the manner in which
he will handle the case and what penalty he will seek. At least, his will
be the first choice. He must first decide if he will seek imprisonment.
If he does not, that would apparently settle the question. It seems un-
likely that the trial judge, in consulting with the prosecutor, would de-
cide he might impose imprisonment, thus necessitating appointing
counsel in a situation where the prosecutor does not even seek it.
When the prosecutor does seek imprisonment, the next step is the
pretrial consultation Chief Justice Burger foresaw between prosecutor
and trial judge. However, one might speculate that in reality in the har-
ried press of the legal process, the trial judge will automatically appoint
counsel in situations where imprisonment is being sought. The judge
would realize that if he denies counsel he has limited the scope of the pen-
alty he can impose. In any case, he would probably also seek to mini-
mize the otherwise searching pretrial inquiry necessary to decide the
counsel issue. Rather, in order to insure fairness, he would simply fol-
low the prosecutor's lead and appoint counsel.
Whether prosecutor, judge or both decide on the appointment of
counsel, there is also the matter of what standards will be employed.
When the Supreme Court held that no one may be imprisoned without
counsel, it was dealing with imprisonment in-fact, as distinguished
from imprisonment in-law.80 Imprisonment in-law refers to any situa-
tion where imprisonment could potentially be imposed as punishment
for an offense. Imprisonment in-fact refers to the situation where a
person convicted of a given offense is actually imprisoned. The deci-
80. For a thorough examination of this distinction, see Junker, The Right to
Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REv. 685 (1968).
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sion on appointment of counsel can be made by either the case-by-case
method focusing on whether this particular defendant is likely to be in
fact imprisoned or it can be made by using a fixed standard.
The fixed standard approach would appoint or deny counsel depend-
ing upon the specific charge. For example, if 95 % of the defendants
convicted of a given misdemeanor have not been sent to jail, then coun-
sel would not be appointed. How about 85%? 50%? If, on the
other hand, a certain percentage of those convicted of a specific charge
are actually imprisoned, then all those charged with that offense would
be provided with counsel. Again, what percentage will fix the stand-
ard?
In the case-by-case method, the punishment to be imposed would be
determined with respect to the individual defendant. This approach,
involving a greater amount of judicial discretion, would be more effi-
cient in terms of the cost of appointed counsel since fewer appoint-
ments would probably be made. The fixed standard would be more
expensive in terms of the number of lawyers appointed in cases where
an individualized determination would have shown no imprisonment
likely. This cost, however, might be offset in time saved by minimiz-
ing the pretrial conference. A fixed standard also eliminates any
problems of impartiality which the pre-trial predictive evaluation as-
sociated with the case-by-case method might create.
The initial implementation of Argersinger is likely to involve a com-
bination of both methods. The decision as to whether counsel is to be
appointed would be made on a case-by-case basis until an imprison-
ment/offense pattern could be adequately determined in a given jur-
isdiction. Later the decision would be made according to a fixed
standard developed from these patterns. Thus, the determination con-
cerning appointed counsel would be based on the offense charged.
This would result in the right to appointed counsel, once again, being
made dependent upon the name of the offense, albeit on a differnet
level.
Prosecute or Not?
The majority opinion presents prosecutors and judges with a choice
as the trial of an indigent misdemeanant approaches. This choice
would be between appointing counsel for the indigent and thereby ena-
bling the prosecutor to seek a punishment of imprisonment or proceed-
ing without counsel with the realization that only a fine may be im-
posed.
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However, when dealing with an indigent, there arises the question of
the applicability and enforceability of a fine. This question may ne-
cessitate a close examination of just who is indigent. The man may
be too poor to hire an attorney but not too poor to pay a small fine-
which for him might still have a punitive effect and still be a deterrent.
However, if any fine were too much of a burden, what could the court
do? The judge could not impose a fine and then imprison the indi-
gent when he was unable to pay.
In Tate v. Short"' the defendant was convicted of traffic offenses in
the Corporation Court of Houston, Texas. This court could impose
only fines. After failing to pay his $425 fine, the indigent defendant
was committed to the municipal prison farm. The United States Su-
preme Court found that his imprisonment was unconstitutional as a de-
nial of equal protection since punishment was limited to a fine for
those who could pay it, but converted to imprisonment for those who
could not.8 2
Thus, Argersinger may leave prosecutors and trial courts with but
two choices when dealing with indigents. The first choice would be to
appoint counsel for the accused and thus keep all options open-im-
prisonment or fine. The other would be simply not to prosecute at all.
Prosecutors might interpret these as being the real alternatives, lest they
see the efficacy of the criminal justice system weakened by the imposi-
tion of unenforceable penalties, and their own time wasted in the proc-
ess.
8 3
81. 401 U.S. 395 (1971). This decision built on the earlier Williams v. Illinois,
399 U.S. 235 (1970), which had held that a combination sentence of fine and im-
prisonment could not be extended in the case of an indigent to a sentence of solely
imprisonment extending beyond the maximum term prescribed for the charge. As to
the question of an eighth amendment problem regarding excessive fine for an indigent,
examine People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686 (Ct. App. 1966). There
the defendant had pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor of assault. The court found it
illegal to imprison the defendant for his prison term of one year (eight months for
good behavior) and an additional five hundred days when the indigent could not pay
the $500 fine. The court reasoned that if excessive fine had a meaning, it related to
what was reasonable, usual, proper, or just. In the case of this defendant, his was
necessarily excessive.
82. In this opinion the Court emphasized that it was not unconstitutional to im-
prison a defendant who has the means to pay but refuses. The Court also referred
to alternative methods of collecting fines, such as installment plans. 401 U.S. at
399-401. Argersinger will give the states new impetus to explore these approaches.
83. Another query is at what stage this new right to counsel is to become available.
The majority and concurring opinions referred to the trial. Justice Douglas stated
what every judge must know, and Chief Justice Burger described the pre-trial decision.
However, if counsel is not appointed until the time of trial, it may already be too late
to preserve due process. This question is beyond the scope of this comment and in-
volves the matter of the "critical stage." E.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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CONCLUSION
In states where the right to counsel had not previously been so ex-
tensive, Argersinger may force a revision of the public defender system.
After a period of experimentation, classifications may solidify. As a
result, for offenses for which imprisonment has in fact seldom been im-
posed, counsel will not be appointed. Likewise, where imprisonment
is customarily imposed, counsel will be appointed. A more individu-
alized treatment appears unrealistic.
The majority opinion concerned itself with imprisonment in-fact,
rather than imprisonment in-law. That is, the important factor is not
whether an offense can, by statute, be punished by confinement, but
rather if it will be. This may foreshadow a realignment of the criminal
process whereby certain types of offenses punished by minor fines only
might be entirely separated from the criminal justice system. Offenses
punishable by fine only could come to be considered as quasi-crimi-
nal.8 4  If they can in some way be taken out of the sixth amendment's
coverage of "all criminal prosecutions," then the same substantive pro-
tections are not necessary. Such infractions might be dealt with in an
administrative fashion rather than as crimes. Then, while certain safe-
guards might be necessary, the full range of constitutional protections
might not be applicable. One result of Argersinger may be a new need
to examine and define exactly what is a crime.8 5
This possible separation from the criminal justice system is distinct
from the question of an eventual further expansion of the right to coun-
sel. If, however, these minor offenses remain within the existing sys-
tem, several arguments can be advanced in favor of making the right
more inclusive. First, the due process rationale of Argersinger is equal-
ly applicable to non-imprisonment prosecutions. The right to counsel
is now considered fundamental whenever imprisonment is to be im-
84. One court which has dealt with the concept of a quasi-crime stated: "The
word 'crime' does not include 'certain quasi-criminal acts or "offenses" ' such as e.g.,
the violation of municipal ordinances 'where the act is not made a crime by the gen-
eral law of the state or by virtue of authority delegated by the state to the municipal
corporation'; at common law, independent of statute, 'punishments for the violation of
municipal ordinances are treated as civil actions'; the imprisonment is not deemed to be
punishment but rather the means of coercing the payment of the fine. 14 Am. Jur.
Criminal Law, sections 2, 9; Annotation, 33 L.R.A. 33; 48 L.R.A., N.S., 156."
State v. Laird, 25 N.J. 298, 135 A.2d 859, 861-62 (1957). However, the court stated
that in an offense, quasi-criminal in nature, the same regard exists as in strictly crim-
inal cases for essential civil liberties designed to secure the individual against arbi-
trary action.
85. For discussion concerning the meaning of crimes and criminal prosecutions in
a right-to-jury context, see Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the
Constitutional Guarantee of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1926); Kaye,
Petty Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 245 (1959).
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posed. The right could come to be considered equally fundamental
when only a fine is imposed. Additionally, in reaching this due proc-
ess result, emphasis could be placed on the fact that the fourteenth
amendment specifically includes deprivation of property as well as dep-
rivation of liberty.
Although it has never been relied upon in the right to appointed
counsel decisions, another argument for expansion utilizes the equal
protection clause. If a rich man, faced with a fine, would normally
employ a lawyer, a poor man should be provided with one.
The arguments for maintaining the Argersinger limitation empha-
size the practical rather than the theoretical. The right to counsel
could continue to be interpreted as not applying to "all criminal prose-
cutions" due to historical and policy reasons. Similar factors have
been used to support the limitation that the courts have placed on the
right to trial by jury.
Weighing all these arguments, the language of the constitution must
be added. The sixth amendment does say "all criminal prosecutions."
On balance, the case for expansion is the more persuasive. Barring a
change in the nature of the criminal process, the Argersinger decision
permits an eventual expansion of the right to counsel to any situation
in which a person is arrested by a policeman, taken before a judge in a
courtroom, fined, and most of all, branded and considered criminal by
society.
RICHARD E. WEICHER
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